Sri Lanka's homegrown ethnic solution: Jehan Perera

In May this year, when the Sri Lankan government was faced with the serious threat of an investigation by the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, it made several promises to the international community that helped to sway the vote in its favor.

These promises included moving forward without delay in healing the wounds of war in the country, specifically resettling the displaced persons and finding a political solution to the ethnic conflict. The implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which established devolved provincial governments, stood at the center of this promise.
On numerous occasions President Mahinda Rajapaksa has made reference to the government's commitment to implementing this partially implemented law. He has even said he is willing to go beyond it, as “13th Amendment plus 1.” But now, after the military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, there is increasing emphasis placed by the government on a yet unspecified and vague “homegrown” solution.
Government spokepersons have stated that just as they defied international expectations in militarily defeating the LTTE with their own plan and strategy, so will they finally bring a political solution to the ethnic conflict in their own way.
The 13th Amendment to the Constitution was promulgated in the context of the Indian effort at mediating an end to the conflict in 1987 and was an outcome of the Indo Lanka Peace Accord. It is therefore not home grown and gave a degree of autonomy to the provinces that they had not enjoyed in the context of Sri Lanka’s unitary Constitution. There was an imposed aspect to the 13th Amendment, because it took place in the aftermath of the Indian invasion of Sri Lankan airspace and the halting of Sri Lankan military operations against the LTTE.
It is therefore to be expected that India would be particularly observant about the implementation of this law. The implementation of the 13th Amendment would help to restore some measure of Indian credibility as Sri Lanka’s superpower neighbor. If the Sri Lankan government were to strengthen the provincial council system along the lines of President Rajapaksa's earlier pledge of 13th Amendment plus 1, there is no doubt this would be satisfying to the Indian government and help to maintain its own credibility in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, which is liable to become volatile on the issue.
The All Party Representatives Committee appointed nearly two years ago by the president to work out a mutually acceptable political solution has utilized the existing arrangements for the devolution of power as found in the 13th Amendment as the basis of its own proposal for a political power-sharing p proposal.
Although the sincerity of those who have met regularly in the APRC on more than 120 occasions cannot be doubted, there have been weaknesses in the structure that have eroded its credibility to some extent. One is that the largest opposition party, the United National Party, and the largest Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance, have not been participating in the process, the former due to grievances with the government and the latter on account of not being invited to participate in the APRC.
A further weakness has been the cavalier attitude with which the government has often treated the APRC's proposals in the past. When the APRC was about to unveil its interim proposals the government withheld these proposals and instead proposed to implement the 13th Amendment as it existed.
On the other hand, the APRC has sought to clear the ambiguities in the existing provincial council law, such as the list of concurrent powers that are shared by both the central government and the provincial councils to the invariable disadvantage of the latter. The APRC has also proposed entirely new improvements to the scheme of devolution, by creating an entirely new upper chamber, by which representatives from the provincial councils will have a voice in central government.
In this context the most recent declarations by sections of the government spearheaded by representatives of the Sinhalese nationalist parties are neither surprising nor reassuring. With general elections looming and presidential elections also a possibility, the government would not wish to antagonize any section of the voting population, especially among the Sinhalese majority that constitutes about three-quarters of this electorate, and whose undivided vote would propel President Rajapaka and his government to yet another election victory.
The Sinhalese voters have been strongly influenced by the Sinhalese nationalist agenda. The government needs to balance this against earning the disfavor of the Tamil people and the international community to whom it has made promises.
There is concern within the government that the devolution of power will lead to the multiplication of separatist sentiment, even if only to carve out small ethnic enclaves from the Muslim and Hill Country Tamil people, in addition to the demand by the Sri Lankan Tamils of the north and east. An indication of the government's approach to dealing with the ethnic minorities was seen in the manner in which it compelled the leadership of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party and the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal leaderships to contest elections under the ruling party's banner, rather than separately in a manner that highlighted autonomous Tamil political power.
On the other hand, in adopting the "homegrown" approach to the solution to the ethnic conflict, the government needs to bear two factors in mind. The first is that the political solution to the ethnic conflict cannot be imposed on the Tamil people. What the government has successfully demonstrated is that a militant movement can be defeated by military means. But the nationalism of one people cannot prevail by force of military victories or larger numbers over the nationalism of another people.
The solutions to ethnic conflicts, if they are to be sustainable, need to be negotiated based on mutual accommodation, with space for more negotiations and accommodations in the future. An imposed solution to an ethnic conflict, even if it is described as a political solution, is likely to break down in the longer term.
The imposed nature of the 13th Amendment in 1987 can also be given as evidence for its failure in implementation. The value of the APRC’s proposals is that they are the result of over 120 meetings within the ruling coalition and with some opposition parties, which seek to give a homegrown quality to the 13th Amendment.
The second factor the government needs to take into account is the promises it has made in the recent past, which are being watched by the international community. These promises include resettling the bulk of the internally displaced people by the end of the year, and also the implementation of the 13th Amendment.
At a time when its relations with the Western countries have become troubled in many respects, Sri Lanka needs to keep faith with the countries that have supported it during the period of war, especially India, which is its closest neighbor. This is a relationship that needs to be strengthened by keeping to promises made.(UPI Asia)